Pitched as a cure for three decades of regulatory paralysis, for anyone who has watched a road project stall in the courts or a house go unbuilt for want of a pipe.

The Policy: ACT Infrastructure Policy — October 2023 →

What it does

ACT entered the 2023 coalition government with the most ambitious infrastructure deregulation agenda of any party. Its core commitments — secured in the National–ACT coalition agreement — moved swiftly into legislation:

• Repealed Labour's RMA replacements. The Natural and Built Environment Act 2023 and the Spatial Planning Act 2023 were repealed on 23 December 2023, with the RMA reinstated as the interim framework while a permanent replacement is designed.
• Fast-track Approvals Act 2024. Passed its third reading on 17 December 2024, this legislation creates a permanent fast-track consenting regime for infrastructure, housing, energy, and development projects. Applications have been accepted since 7 February 2025. The Act establishes expert panels — not ministers — as final decision-makers, while ministers determine which projects are referred.
• 149 projects admitted to the fast-track list, including 44 housing developments, 43 infrastructure projects (at least 180 km of new roads, rail and public transport routes), 22 renewable energy projects, and 11 mining projects. Notable examples: Eden Park redevelopment, Roads of National and Regional Significance, and Trans-Tasman Resources' seabed mining proposal (which a fast-track panel later rejected on environmental grounds, citing unacceptable risk to Māui dolphins).
• RMA replacement legislation (Phase 3). ACT MP Simon Court, serving as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for RMA Reform, co-designed two new bills with Infrastructure Minister Chris Bishop announced in March 2025: a Planning Bill (land use and development) and a Natural Environment Bill (freshwater and biodiversity). Passage targeted for 2026. Government modelling by Castalia Limited estimates $13.3 billion in savings over 30 years, with up to 46% of current consent applications becoming unnecessary.
• GST sharing with councils. ACT's 2023 manifesto proposed sharing 50% of GST revenue from new home construction with the consenting local council — estimated at $1 billion annually — to fund enabling infrastructure (pipes, roads, stormwater). The policy recognises that councils currently bear infrastructure costs while the Crown captures the GST windfall, creating a structural disincentive to consent.
• Water: repealed Three Waters, introduced Local Water Done Well. Labour's centralised water reform was repealed in February 2024. The replacement framework, Local Water Done Well, returns water services to local councils and community-controlled entities, with a statutory prohibition on privatisation. ACT's Cameron Luxton described Labour's regime as "bureaucratic" and welcomed local control.
• Cancelled Wellington's Let's Get Wellington Moving and the Lake Onslow pumped hydro project, redirecting those commitments.
• International building materials: Secured regulatory changes allowing certified overseas construction products into the New Zealand market, aimed at reducing construction costs through competition.

The result

The fast-track regime has produced its first concrete outcomes. A draft decision rejecting Trans-Tasman Resources' seabed mining showed the expert-panel model can refuse politically contentious applications — a point supporters cite as evidence that environmental safeguards remain functional within the new system.

Economist Shamubeel Eaqub, commissioned by Civil Contractors, Infrastructure New Zealand and Water New Zealand, found that pausing and cancelling infrastructure projects has cost New Zealand $11.8 billion over 25 years — a figure that lends empirical weight to the case for faster consenting. The report recommended a consistent multi-year pipeline and mandatory "cost of stopping" assessments.

ACT's property-rights framing — that people should be free to develop their land unless they harm others — differs substantively from National's more technocratic consenting-efficiency approach. Simon Court has consistently argued for separating urban planning from environmental protection, creating distinct legislative regimes rather than a single integrated act.

Gary Taylor, Chief Executive of the Environmental Defence Society, called the Fast-track Approvals Act "unbalanced" and warned that ministers would gain "unprecedented powers to approve pet projects." He compared proposed ministerial override provisions to Rob Muldoon-era overreach. The EDS also argued existing fast-track mechanisms were already adequate, averaging 97-day turnarounds on referred projects.

Greenpeace Aotearoa described the Act as "anti-democratic, anti-transparency, vulnerable to corruption." Forest & Bird warned the Phase 3 RMA replacement risked duplicated processes and litigation by separating land-use planning from environmental management.

Maori concerns centre on consultation rights. Ngati Toa Rangatira argued the fast-track bill would allow "big corporations to do anything they want without any say from the public, iwi, hapu." A mandatory iwi-nominated panel member requirement was removed during select committee, though Treaty settlement obligations continue to require iwi involvement in some projects. A DLA Piper analysis notes that early iwi engagement remains critical to avoiding delays even within the new regime.

By December 2025, the Fast-track Approvals Amendment Bill attracted 2,518 written submissions with 95% of submitters opposed, suggesting public concern has not abated.

The impacts to watch

• Environmental precedent from the 149-project list. Projects previously rejected on environmental grounds — including Trans-Tasman Resources' seabed mining — are back in play. The seabed mining draft rejection is being appealed; what the final decision means for Maui dolphin habitat will be closely watched as a test of panel independence.
• Ministerial power creep. The Fast-track Approvals Amendment Bill, described by critics as enabling "ministers' pet projects", proposes giving the Crown power to amend the Act by Order in Council — bypassing Parliament. The EDS warns this is a constitutionally significant Henry VIII clause.
• Housing pipeline reality check. Going for Housing Growth infrastructure funding tools and the fast-track housing projects (44 approved developments) will test whether deregulation actually translates into consented, built homes — or just more approved-but-unbuilt subdivisions.
• RMA replacement timeline. The Planning Bill and Natural Environment Bill are targeted for passage in 2026. The Chapman Tripp election analysis predicted prolonged uncertainty; that uncertainty has in fact persisted through the interim period, creating planning hesitation for developers.
• International trade exposure. Conservation groups warned the fast-track regime could breach environmental clauses in free trade agreements with the UK and EU. No formal trade challenge has yet materialised, but it remains a live legal risk.
• Council fiscal incentives. If the GST-sharing proposal is legislated, it would represent one of the most significant changes to the council infrastructure funding model in decades — shifting councils from gatekeepers reluctant to consent (because infrastructure costs fall on existing ratepayers) to active promoters of growth.

Our suggestion: speed vs scrutiny

The ACT infrastructure programme poses a genuine policy dilemma rather than a simple choice between developers and environmentalists. New Zealand's consenting delays are real and costly — Eaqub's $11.8 billion figure is not trivial, and the housing affordability crisis has infrastructure supply as a key structural cause. The property-rights approach ACT advocates has intellectual coherence: if your activity harms no one else, why should it require permission?

But what gets compressed when environmental review is accelerated is not just paperwork — it is the process by which future costs are identified before they are locked in. Trans-Tasman Resources' seabed mining proposal was previously rejected twice through standard processes; it took a fast-track panel to produce a third rejection, this time with more limited public input. The outcome was right, but the route was narrower. The question is whether the panel model can consistently replicate that result at scale across 149 projects, or whether the pressure toward approval — built into a system designed to say yes — will gradually erode the no.

The GST-sharing mechanism offers a more structurally interesting fix than pure deregulation: align council incentives with housing growth rather than simply removing oversight. If that policy were legislated and properly funded, it might do more durable good than consenting speed-ups alone.